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1 Introduction
Households living in rural areas of low-income countries face a great amount of risk. Rev-
enue from agricultural production is usually low and volatile as a result of extreme weather
conditions, such as erratic monsoon rains in South Asia. Further, outside job opportunities
are often lacking, and access to financial instruments to insure against consumption fluctua-
tions is limited. In such an environment, households in a community rely on one another for
insurance.
There is ample empirical evidence that households in poor villages achieve a remarkable
amount of insurance, but they do not fully share the risks they face (Townsend, 1994, and many
others). Moreover, direct evidence shows that households make state-contingent transfers to
one another (Udry, 1994; Kinnan, 2014). The literature has focused on two imperfections to
explain the observed partial insurance: private information (Wang, 1995; Ligon, 1998) and
lack of commitment (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2002, LTW hereafter). This paper
focuses on the case where limited commitment (LC hereafter) is the friction that may cause a
deviation from perfect risk sharing. Households in small communities can often observe shocks
faced by their neighbors (such as bad harvest or illness), but no authority exists to enforce
informal risk sharing contracts. The approach of this paper could also be used to compare
models of mutual insurance with private information as an alternative or additional friction.
However, this is left for future research.
In addition to studying the relevance of LC, I investigate whether heterogeneity in risk pref-
erences is useful in explaining the consumption allocation. In particular, I allow households’
coefficients of relative risk aversion to depend on observable household characteristics. This
is an important extension, because efficient risk sharing has two main implications. First, in-
comes should be pooled. Second, less risk-averse households should bear more uninsurable risk
(Borch, 1962; Wilson, 1968). Assuming that risk preferences are homogeneous, one excludes
an additional motive for risk sharing.
I show under what conditions the parameters of the LC model are identified. Additional
parameters compared to the perfect risk sharing model are pinned down by binding enforce-
ment/participation constraints. I derive simulated maximum likelihood estimators taking
into account measurement error in income and consumption and an unobservable heterogene-
ity term in the curvature of the utility function. I solve the LC model on a grid of parameters
by standard value function iteration, but exploiting the characteristics of its solution at each
step. At the estimation stage I interpolate the solution, hence reducing computational time. I
statistically compare risk sharing models in terms explaining consumption shares given income
shares, using a likelihood ratio-based tests introduced by Vuong (1989).
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I apply the estimation and model selection methods to study risk sharing in three Indian
villages, using data collected by the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics (ICRISAT). I find that the risk sharing model with both LC and preference hetero-
geneity fits the consumption data from each village significantly better in a statistical sense
than models with full commitment and/or without preference heterogeneity. Further, I find
that the LC model with heterogenous preferences outperforms the benchmark models in terms
of (i) explaining the response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks, (ii) accounting
for the variation of consumption unexplained by household and time effects, and (iii) captur-
ing the variation of inequality across time and villages and predicting changes in inequality,
as measured by the variance of log consumption and the Gini coefficient.
Finally, I simulate the effects on the consumption allocation of a counterfactual tax and
transfer policy, which can be thought of as public insurance (Krueger and Perri, 2011; Broer,
2011),1 taking into account existing informal risk sharing arrangements. According to perfect
risk sharing models, such a policy has no effect on the consumption allocation, while LC
models are able to predict a redistribution of consumption. The LC model with preference
heterogeneity predicts larger benefits to the poor than its homogenous counterpart. The
policy simulation exercise illustrates the quantitative importance of LC and heterogeneity in
risk preferences for ex-ante policy evaluation (Todd and Wolpin, 2006, 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next, I discuss the related literature.
Section 2 details the theoretical models of risk sharing. In Section 3, the empirical models
are set up and simulated maximum likelihood estimators are derived. Section 4 presents the
application to household survey data from three Indian villages, including the counterfactual
policy simulation. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
The early literature on risk sharing in village economies includes Townsend (1994), Grimard
(1997), Dubois (2000), Dercon and Krishnan (2003a,b), and others. The tests of perfect risk
sharing performed by these papers are of reduced form and alternative models of risk sharing
are not examined.2 These papers reject perfect risk sharing, but find that only a small fraction
of idiosyncratic income shocks translates into consumption fluctuations.
A next wave of the literature explicitly considers alternative models of risk sharing, with
1See also Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), who argue that, under LC, formal insurance provided by the state
may crowd out informal insurance transfers to the extent that welfare decreases. They then provide reduced-
form evidence on the crowding out of informal transfers as a result of the Progresa program in Mexico, but do
not use the model to predict the transfers.
2See also the seminal papers by Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) for tests of perfect risk sharing in the US.
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frictions such as LC and asymmetric information, but only studies their reduced-form implica-
tions, see Fafchamps (1999), Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001),
Dubois et al. (2008), and Kinnan (2014). Kinnan (2014) looks at LC as well as hidden income
and effort as potential impediments to risk sharing in Thai villages. She is able to reject some
implications of all models except for the hidden income one.3
The first paper which acknowledges heterogeneity in risk preferences when testing perfect
risk sharing is Altug and Miller (1990). They allow preferences to depend on household demo-
graphics. Dubois (2000) provides a more powerful, non-directional test. Mazzocco and Saini
(2012) construct nonparametric tests of perfect risk sharing allowing for preference hetero-
geneity, and reject perfect risk sharing within villages but not within caste groups in Indian
villages. Chiappori et al. (2013) estimate a coefficient of relative risk aversion for each house-
hold under the assumption that perfect risk sharing occurs, using an 84-wave panel from
Thailand. They find substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences and that consumption in-
surance is close to perfect. I test perfect risk sharing against a well-specified alternative while
allowing for heterogeneity in risk preferences.
LTW estimate the model of risk sharing with LC in a structural manner. However, they
do not perform any statistical tests on parameters or model selection. In a recent paper,
Karaivanov and Townsend (2013), building on Paulson et al. (2006), apply Vuong’s test, like
the present paper, to compare risk sharing models with different frictions, in particular, they
consider models with asymmetric information as well. In the rural part of their Thai sample
and with income and consumption data alone, Karaivanov and Townsend (2013) reject full risk
sharing, but not by much, and find that the moral hazard regime fits the data best, sometimes
statistically tied with LC or savings only. The main contribution of the present paper with
respect to their work is to introduce heterogeneity in risk preferences. Their modeling and
solution strategy also differ in that they assume the presence of a financial intermediary, while
I consider a model of mutual insurance among households as LTW.
Karaivanov (2012) applies a similar methodology to study which type of financial friction
(savings only, borrowing and lending with default, or moral hazard constrained insurance)
is most useful in explaining the choice to become an entrepreneur in Thailand. Relatedly,
Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) uses an experimental measure of risk aversion and finds evidence that
occupational choice is affected by risk preferences in the US. He argues that this should be
taken into account when evaluating how well people are able to mitigate the adverse effects
3However, the inverse Euler equation, which she rejects, should hold for the hidden income model as well,
not just for hidden effort, see Ligon (1998). Further, the hidden income model can be written as a special case
of the hidden effort model: specify the production function as y = e, where y is output and e is effort, and
assume that the cost of effort is linear.
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of risk they face. Accounting for how risk preferences and/or lack of consumption insurance
affect occupational choice and/or the choice of production technologies is beyond the scope of
the present paper.
This paper is also related to the literature on explaining changes over time in consumption
inequality given income inequality. Krueger and Perri (2006) find that qualitatively LC can
account for consumption inequality increasing less than income inequality in the US over the
period 1980-2003. However, it implies too much risk sharing, i.e., not enough increase in
consumption inequality. On the other hand, Blundell et al. (2008) document that income
shocks have become less persistent, hence easier to insure against. Structural estimation
results similar to the ones presented in this paper could be used to predict the effects of such
changes in income processes on consumption inequality.
2 Models of risk sharing
Suppose that there are N infinitely-lived, risk-averse households in a community. They con-
sume a private and perishable consumption good c. Each household i maximizes its expected
lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=1
δtui (cit) ,
where E0 is the expected value at time 0 calculated with respect to the probability measure
describing the common beliefs about income processes, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the (common) discount
factor, ui() describes the instantaneous preferences of household i and is strictly increasing
and strictly concave, and cit is consumption by household i at time t.
Each household i is endowed with random income Yi. Yi follows a Markov process and
is independent across households. The distribution of Yi, ∀i, is common knowledge ex ante,
and so are income realizations ex post at each time t. That is, there are no informational
problems. Let st denote the state of the world which describes the income realizations of all
households in the community at time t, and st denote the history of income states, that is,
st = (s1, ..., st). Note that income is exogenous by assumption. That is, the effect of risk on
choices among different income generating processes is ignored.
I interpret the models as predicting consumption shares, given income shares and aggregate
income/consumption in the community.4 In other words, any difference between household
consumption and income is thought of as a transfer to or from the rest of the village, and not
as saving or dissaving explicitly.
4Income from the data is rescaled so that aggregate consumption and aggregate income are always equal.
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The rest of this section describes two models in turn. First, I consider the model of perfect
risk sharing. Second, I detail the model of risk sharing with LC.
2.1 Perfect risk sharing
To find the Pareto-optimal allocations, one can solve the following problem: the (utilitarian)
social planner maximizes a weighted sum of households’ expected lifetime utilities,
max
{cit(st)}
∑
i
λi
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
δtpi
(
st
)
ui
(
cit
(
st
))
, (1)
where λi is the (initial) Pareto weight of household i in the social planner’s objective, pi (st)
is the probability of history st occurring, and cit (st) denotes the consumption of household i
when history st has occurred; subject to the resource constraint∑
i
cit
(
st
) ≤∑
i
yit (st) ,∀st,∀t, (2)
where yit (st) is the income of household i at time t and state st.
The well-known result that for any two households i and v,
u′v (cvt (s
t))
u′i (cit (st))
=
λi
λv
,∀st,∀t, (3)
that is, the ratio of marginal utilities is constant over time and across states of the world,
follows from the first order conditions of the social planner’s problem (Borch, 1962; Wilson,
1968). Equation (3) implies that all idiosyncratic risks are insured away, and households share
aggregate risk efficiently. In particular, less risk-averse households bear more uninsurable risk.
2.2 Risk sharing with limited commitment
To find the constrained-efficient consumption allocations, I follow Kehoe and Perri (2002),
but consider an endowment economy, and solve the following problem: the social planner
maximizes (1), subject to (2) and the enforcement/participation constraints (PCs),
∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
δr−tpi
(
sr | st)ui (cir (sr)) ≥ Uauti (st) ,∀st,∀t,∀i, (4)
where pi (sr | st) is the probability of history sr occurring given that history st occurred up to
time t. The right hand side of (4) is the value of autarky, i.e., the outside option, for household
i at state st and time t. LC means that each household may deviate and revert to autarky
upon receiving its current income. Hence, the mutual insurance contract must provide at least
as much lifetime utility as autarky given any history of income shocks. Note that the PCs,
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(4), assume that if a household deviates, other households in the community do not enter into
any risk sharing arrangement with it in the future. That is, households apply a grim trigger
strategy.
In autarky households consume their own income, and the community may impose addi-
tional punishments on defectors, such as exclusion from social activities, as in LTW. For ease
of interpretation, I model such punishments as a fraction of consumption each period. Hence,
in autarky cit (st) = (1− ϕ) yit (st) ,∀st,∀t,∀i, where 0 ≤ ϕ < 1. Then, the value of autarky
can be computed by iterating the Bellman equation
Uauti (st) = ui ((1− ϕ) yit (st)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1 | st)Uauti (st+1) . (5)
Individual savings are assumed absent, as in Kocherlakota (1996), LTW, and others.5
The problem is not recursive, because future decision variables enter into today’s PCs.
Therefore, even if income were i.i.d., consumption may depend on the whole history of income
realizations.
Denoting the multiplier on the PC of household i, (4), by δtpi (st)µi (st), and the multiplier
on the resource constraint, (2), by δtpi (st) ρ (st), the Lagrangian is
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
δtpi
(
st
){∑
i
[
λiui
(
cit
(
st
)) 1
2
+µi
(
st
)( ∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
δr−tpi
(
sr | st)ui (cir (sr))− Uauti (st)
)]
+ ρ
(
st
)(∑
i
yit (st)− cit
(
st
))}
.
Using the ideas of Marcet and Marimon (2011), the Lagrangian can be written in the form
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
δtpi
(
st
){∑
i
[
Mi
(
st−1
)
ui
(
cit
(
st
))
+µi
(
st
) (
ui
(
cit
(
st
))− Uauti (st))]+ ρ (st)
(∑
i
yit (st)− cit
(
st
))}
,
5One could potentially assume that households in autarky have access to a storage technology. While
a solution can often be found for a given set of parameter values, the non-emptiness of the feasible set is
not guaranteed, because for some discount factors some households would be better off in autarky than in a
risk sharing arrangement without storage in equilibrium. Then, aggregate consumption becomes endogenous.
Further, it is unclear why such a technology would not be available in equilibrium as well, if it were available
in autarky. Ábrahám and Laczó (2014) analyze the LC model with storage, including in equilibrium and at
the aggregate level. Estimating that model is computationally challenging, further, (public) assets are not
observed in the ICRISAT dataset used in this paper.
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where Mi (st) = Mi (st−1) + µi (st), with Mi (s0) = λi (see also Kehoe and Perri, 2002). In
words, Mi (st) is the current Pareto weight of household i, and it is equal to its initial Pareto
weight plus the sum of the Lagrange multipliers on its PCs along the history st.
Consider household i sharing risk with household v again. Define
xi
(
st
) ≡ Mi (st)
Mv (st)
,
the relative Pareto weight assigned to household i when history st has occurred, normalizing
the weight of household v to 1. Think of household v as the average household in a village,
hence the normalization is 1
N
∑
i xi (s
t) = 1, ∀st.
The vector of relative weights x (st), with elements xi (st), can be used as a co-state variable.
The solution consists of the policy functions xit (st, xt−1) and cit (st, xt−1), ∀i, where xt−1 is a
sufficient statistic for everything that happened in the past. The optimality condition which
links consumptions and the current relative Pareto weights is
u′v (cvt (st, xt−1))
u′i (cit (st, xt−1))
= xit (st, xt−1) ,∀i. (6)
At last, the value functions can be written recursively as
Vi (st, xt−1) = ui (cit (st, xt−1)) + δ
∑
st+1
pi (st+1)Vi(st+1, xt (st, xt−1)). (7)
The solution is fully characterized by a set of state-dependent optimal intervals (LTW),
which give the relative Pareto weights for which both PCs are satisfied in each income state s
for household i. Denote the interval for household i sharing risk with the ‘rest of the village’
for state s by [xsi , xsi ]. On-line appendix A describes how the intervals are computed.
I then use only xsi , which is pinned down by the PC of household i, ∀s, ∀i, to find the
predicted consumption allocation. However, the values for xsi are only approximations of the
values of the N -household case, because tomorrow’s value functions depend on xsi , ∀s, which
are determined by PCs binding for the average household, v. That is, I assume that the
distribution of incomes (and hence of the Pareto weights) and preference heterogeneity for the
rest of the village is not of first-order. Instead, each of the other N − 1 households receives
the village mean income and has average risk aversion. Note that the idea is similar to that
of Krusell and Smith (1998).6 Note also that the quality of approximation may differ across
models, and the model comparisons will be made given the unknown quality of approximation.
6Solving the model with N households would require N + (N − 1) state variables (each household’s income
and the relative Pareto weights) with N ≥ 31 in the application, which is infeasible. Both LTW and Dubois
et al. (2008) use a similar household - rest of the village characterization. LTW have used this approach to
approximate the solution to a simple example with many (500) households, which should be quite close to the
continuum case. They find that the average value of the correlation coefficient between the two consumption
paths is 0.972.
8
Given xsi , ∀s, ∀i, an iterated version of the updating rule of LTW can be used to compute
the predicted relative Pareto weights at time t, xˆt, and the predicted consumptions, cˆt; given
xt−1, computed from the consumption allocation of time t− 1 (see below), and sit = (yit, yvt),
∀i, where yit is the closest grid point to household i’s income at time t in the data and yvt is
the closest grid point to average income in the village at time t:
1. For each household, check whether xi,t−1 < xsiti . If so, set xˆit = x
sit
i and compute cˆit from
(6) with cvt equal to average consumption of the rest of the village in state sit, i.e., to
(yit + (N − 1)yvt − cˆit) /(N − 1).
2. For the remaining households, i.e., ∀i such that xi,t−1 ≥ xsiti , set xˆit = xi,t−1 and compute
cˆit from (6) now with cvt equal to average consumption of all unconstrained households.
Then compute the ‘real’ xˆit using the left-hand side of (6) given cˆit just computed and cvt
equal to average consumption of the rest of the village. Set xi,t−1 = xit.
3. Repeat steps 1. and 2. for all unconstrained households of the previous iteration and with
the fictional xi,t−1 computed in step 2. Repeat until no PC is violated.
4. Set cˆvt,i = (yit + (N − 1)yvt) /N , which represents average income and consumption in the
village from the model.
3 Empirical models
Assume that the utility function of each household i takes the isoelastic (CRRA) form, i.e.,
ui (cit) =
c1−σiit − 1
1− σi , (8)
where σi > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) of household i. Let σ denote
average risk aversion in the village (and the risk aversion of the average household v), i.e.,∑N
i=1 σi/N = σ. I allow σi to depend on time-invariant observable covariates of household
i, denoted zi, with elements zik, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}, normalized so that Ezik = 0, ∀k, in each
village, and on an unobservable term. That is,
σi ∼ logN
(
µi, γ
2
σ
)
with µi = log (σ + z′iβ)−
γ2σ
2
,
where β is a parameter vector to be estimated, with elements βk. Note that Eσi = σ + z′iβ.
Let σ∗i = σ + z′iβ and εσi = σi − σ∗i . The term z′iβ captures heterogeneity in the curvature of
the utility function across households which can be related to observables, while εσi captures
unexplained heterogeneity.7
7Guiso and Paiella (2008) construct a direct measure of risk aversion using the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey of
Household Income and Wealth and find that a substantial part of the heterogeneity in risk preferences across
households cannot be explained by observable household characteristics.
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I allow for measurement error in consumption and income, and assume that they are
multiplicative and log-normally distributed. Let c∗it denote consumption observed by the
econometrician, and let exp (εcit) be the multiplicative measurement error in household i’s
consumption at time t. Then, we may write c∗it = exp (εcit) cit, where εcit is independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across households and time, and εcit ∼ N (0, γ2c ), where γ2c is to
be estimated.8 The measurement error in income, denoted εyit, has the same properties, and its
variance is denoted by γ2y . Note that true consumption, cit, and true income, yit, are assumed
to be observed by all households in the community.
I model the allocation of observed consumption c∗t ≡ (c∗1t, ..., c∗it, ..., c∗Nt), for t = 2, ..., T ,
given observed consumption at time 1, c∗1, the history of observed income realizations, y∗t , for
t = 2, ..., T , time-invariant household characteristics, Z = [z1, ..., zi, ..., zN ]
′, and parameters.
In mathematical terms, I derive how the following conditional density can be specified based
on the above models of risk sharing:
f
(
c∗T , ..., c
∗
2 | c∗1, y∗T , ..., y∗2, λ, Z;σ, β, δ, ϕ, γ2c , γ2y , γ2σ, FY
)
, (9)
where the vector of Pareto weights, λ, is a nuisance parameter, θ ≡ (σ, β, δ, ϕ, γ2c , γ2y) are
the parameters to be estimated,9 I consider γ2σ = 0 as the benchmark (i.e., no unobserved
heterogeneity in the curvature of the utility function) and γ2σ = 0.02 as a robustness check,
and FY summarizes households’ income processes. Each of the models of risk sharing of
Section 2 allows us to factorize the density (9). In particular, we may write∏
t=2,...,T
f
(
c∗t | y∗t , xt−1, Z; θ, γ2σ, FY
)
, (10)
where xt−1 is the vector of relative Pareto weights at time t− 1, which has elements xi,t−1 and
is not observed (I deal with this issue below). Note that past incomes and consumptions only
matter through xt−1. Further, remember that current aggregate income and consumption are
assumed given. The models explain consumption shares, but not the evolution of aggregate
consumption.
Given the current relative Pareto weights, xt, one can write the optimality conditions as
u′v(cvt)
u′i(cit)
=
(cvt)
−σ
(cit)
−σi = xit, ∀i. (11)
The next two subsections detail in turn what the model of perfect risk sharing (Section 3.1)
and risk sharing with LC (Section 3.2) say about xit in equation (11), show which parameters
8Measurement error in consumption accounts for the error term in the estimating equations below.
9Below θ often denotes a subset of these parameters, and is used as a short form for ‘parameters to be
estimated.’
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are identified, and discuss how the models are estimated using simulated (pseudo) maximum
likelihood. Afterwards, Section 3.3 expands on the model selection test I apply, namely,
Vuong’s general test.
3.1 Perfect risk sharing
In the case of perfect risk sharing, the current consumption allocation depends only on cur-
rent exogenous variables and not on past ones. Further, it depends neither on the discount
factor, hence δ is not identified, nor on individual income realizations, hence ϕ and γ2y are
not identified, nor on the income processes, hence FY is irrelevant. However, it depends on
xt−1 = λ, ∀t, which is not observable. That is, the co-state variable is constant and equal to
the initial relative Pareto weight. This means that xit = λi,∀t, in equation (11).
Taking the logarithm of the optimality condition (11), with xit = λi, with respect to (true)
consumption and rearranging, one obtains
σi log cit = σ log cvt + log λi.
Next, one can eliminate the unobservable term log λi by taking first differences. This gives
σi (log cit − log ci,t−1) = σ (log cvt − log cv,t−1) . (12)
It is clear that, given the consumption growth of household v (‘the village’), the consumption
growth of household i depends only on the ratio σi/σ, and not on σi and σ separately. This
means that a normalization is needed. I normalize the average coefficient of RRA in each
village to 1, i.e., σ = 1.10 That is, uv() = log() and σi = 1+z′iβ+εσi . Each βk is identified from
the correlation between the corresponding covariate, zk, and the variability of consumption
across households.11
In terms of measured consumptions today, c∗it and c∗vt = (
∑
i c
∗
it) /N , (12) is
(1 + z′iβ + ε
σ
i ) log c
∗
it − log c∗vt = (1 + z′iβ + εσi ) log ci,t−1 − log cv,t−1 + (1 + z′iβ + εσi ) εcit − εcvt.
(13)
Note that (13) is similar to a first-differenced equation often used to test perfect risk sharing,
controlling for village-time effects and household characteristics. Tests in the vein of Townsend
(1994) would include a measure of idiosyncratic risk in that equation and test whether its
coefficient is zero.
10This is true even with a long panel, see Chiappori et al. (2013), who have chosen the same normalization.
11Suppose, for example, that the consumption of households with high zk, for some k, is smoother, i.e., they
bear less consumption risk. According to the model, this is because they are more risk averse, hence βk is
positive. Chiappori et al. (2013) estimate a σi for each household using an 84-wave panel from the Townsend
Thai Monthly Survey. This is not possible with the shorter panel of the ICRISAT dataset used in this paper,
see below.
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Let εc,jt−1 denote an N -vector of realizations of measurement error in households’ consump-
tion at time t − 1, where each element εc,ji,t−1 is drawn from N (0, γ2c ). Let εσ,j denote an
N -vector of realizations of the unobservable part of the coefficient of RRA. I first write the
likelihood of each it observation conditional on
(
εc,jt−1, ε
σ,j
)
. Then, averaging the conditional
likelihood over J draws, I integrate them out. That is, I use a simulated (pseudo) maximum
likelihood estimator (SMLE).12
Let
(
ψprs,ji
)2
(Z, θ) ≡
[(
(N − 1)/N + z′iβ + εσ,ji
)2
+ (N − 1)/N2
]
γ2c and
dprs,jit (Z, θ) ≡
[(
1 + z′iβ + ε
σ,j
i
)
log
(
c∗it
c∗i,t−1/ exp(ε
c,j
i,t−1)
)
− log
(
c∗vt
c∗v,t−1/ exp(ε
c,j
v,t−1)
)]
/ψprs,ji (Z, θ) .
Then, we may write the (pseudo) likelihood of observation it conditional on
(
εc,jt−1, ε
σ,j
)
as
φ
(
dprs,jit (Z, θ)
)
, where φ is the density of the standard normal distribution. Finally, making
J draws, the SMLE maximizes
`prs (Z, θ) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
log
[
1
J
J∑
j=1
φ
(
dprs,jit (Z, θ)
)]
(14)
with respect to θ, that is, β and γ2c . I also estimate the model without preference heterogeneity
for comparison. This means setting β = 0 and γ2σ = 0.
I do not assume that the model is correctly specified, therefore I compute the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters without assuming that the information matrix
equality holds. I also take into account serial correlation. The variance-covariance matrix is
estimated by Aˆ−1BˆAˆ−1, where Aˆ is the estimated Hessian, that is,
Aˆ =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2−∇2θ`it(θˆ), and Bˆ =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 sˆitsˆ
′
it +
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2
∑
r 6=t sˆirsˆ
′
it,
where sˆit = ∇θ`it(θˆ)′ is the score evaluated at the estimated parameters, and where the second
term in the expression for Bˆ accounts for serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002).
3.2 Risk sharing with limited commitment
Remember that in the LC case, the (true) ratio of marginal utilities from the previous period,
xt−1, is a sufficient statistic for everything that happened in the past. Hence, instead of
conditioning on the history of shocks, st, and λ, it is sufficient to condition on the current
income state, st, and xt−1. This means that xit = xit (st, xt−1) in equation (11).
Remember that xˆit and cˆit denote the predicted relative Pareto weight and consumption
of household i at time t. Note that these are functions of (true) income, xt−1, household
12Note that it is not necessary to use simulation to take into account measurement error in consumption at
time t− 1 in the perfect risk sharing case. I do it to be consistent with the LC case.
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characteristics, and parameters, that is, of (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, γ2σ, FY ). Further, in general, they
cannot be expressed analytically, therefore it is necessary to use numerical methods.
Next, I show that the structural parameters are identified, under some conditions. Then,
Section 3.2.2 details how I estimate the model, including how I deal with measurement error.
3.2.1 Identification
When risk sharing is perfect, the predicted consumption allocation is independent of average
risk aversion in the village, σ, the discount factor, δ, and the punishment parameter, ϕ. The
question is whether one can identify these parameters in the case of risk sharing with LC.13
I assume that some but not perfect risk sharing occurs in the data. For simplicity, I consider
two ex-ante identical households. The heterogeneity parameters, β, are identified in the case
of perfect risk sharing as well.
Claim 1. Assume that at least one PC is binding for each household in the long run. Then,
given two parameters among δ, σ, and ϕ, the third is identified.
Proof. In on-line appendix B.
Claim 2. Assume three possible income realizations and that at least two PCs are binding for
each household in the long run. Then, given δ, σ, or ϕ, the other two parameters are jointly
identified.
Proof. In on-line appendix B.
Conjecture 1. Assume that at least three PCs are binding for each household in the long run.
Then, δ, σ, and ϕ are jointly identified.
In the case where three PCs are binding, I provide a three-equation system which pins down
the three parameters, see on-line appendix B. However, I cannot show uniqueness analytically.
Numerically the three parameters are uniquely determined by the system.
3.2.2 Estimation
Replacing for xit in (11) gives
(cvt)
−σ
(cit)
−σi = xˆit (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, FY ) =
cˆvt,i (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, FY )
−σ
cˆit (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, FY )
−σi , ∀i.
13The income processes, FY , which are irrelevant in the perfect risk sharing case but needed now, are
estimated using the income data only and standard methods, see on-line appendix C.
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In terms of measured consumptions today, taking logarithms, replacing σ + z′iβ + εσi for σi,
dividing by σ, and rearranging, we have(
1 +
z′iβ + ε
σ
i
σ
)
log c∗it − log c∗vt =
(
1 +
z′iβ + ε
σ
i
σ
)
log cˆit (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, FY )
− log cˆvt,i (yt, xt−1, Z; θ, FY ) +
(
1 +
z′iβ + ε
σ
i
σ
)
εcit − εcvt. (15)
Further, current incomes are measured with error too, and instead of xi,t−1 only
x∗i,t−1 =
(
exp
(
εcv,t−1
))−σ(
exp
(
εci,t−1
))−(σ+z′iβ+εσi )xi,t−1 (16)
is ‘observed.’ That is, measurement errors in both income and consumption and unobserved
heterogeneity in the coefficient of RRA influence the updating of the state variable. Note that,
contrary to tests of perfect risk sharing in the vein of Townsend (1994), the model with LC
implies a nonlinear relationship between current consumption shares and past consumption
shares, as well as between current consumption shares and current income shares.
Let
(
εy,jt , ε
c,j
t−1
)
denote an N×2 matrix of realizations of measurement errors in households’
income at time t and consumption at time t − 1, where each element εy,jit is drawn from
the distribution N
(
0, γ2y
)
, and each element εc,ji,t−1 is drawn from N (0, γ2c ). Remember that
εσ,j denotes an N -vector of realizations of the unobservable part of the coefficient of RRA.
Knowing x∗i,t−1, ε
c,j
i,t−1, and ε
σ,j
i , and using ε
c,j
t−1 to find ε
c,j
v,t−1, one can use (16) to compute
xi,t−1.14 Similarly, knowing y∗it and ε
y,j
it , one can easily compute yit.
Let
(
ψlc,ji
)2
(Z, θ) ≡
[(
(N − 1)/N + z′iβ+εσ,ji
σ
)2
+ (N − 1)/N2
]
γ2c and
dlc,jit
(
y∗t , x
∗
t−1, Z; θ, FY
) ≡ [(1 + z′iβ + εσ,ji
σ
)
log
(
c∗it
cˆit
(
y∗t , ε
y,j
t , x
∗
t−1, ε
c,j
t−1, Z; θ, FY
))
− log
(
c∗vt
cˆvt,i
(
y∗t , ε
y,j
t , x
∗
t−1, ε
c,j
t−1, Z; θ, FY
))] /ψlc,ji (Z, θ) . (17)
Then, the (pseudo) likelihood of observation it conditional on
(
εy,jt , ε
c,j
t−1, ε
σ,j
)
is
φ
(
dlc,jit
(
y∗t , x
∗
t−1, Z; θ, FY
))
.15 Making J draws, the SMLE maximizes
`lc (θ) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
log
[
1
J
J∑
j=1
φ
(
dlc,jit
(
y∗t x
∗
t−1, Z; θ, FY
))]
. (18)
14With measurement error, all past values of consumption could be informative of xt−1. For tractability, I
only deal with the density (10).
15Note that, in the consumption insurance literature, preference shocks are often used to account for the
error term in the estimating equation, or, as in Cochrane (1991), consumption growth is measured with error.
These alternative assumptions are not suitable in the case of risk sharing with LC. The former because today’s
shock would drop out of the estimating equation (15), while in the latter case one would have to draw the
previous period’s measurement error, εc,jt−1, from a random walk.
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Allowing for misspecification, the SMLE consistently estimates the pseudo-true values of the
parameters and is asymptotically normal as both the number of it observations, denoted M ,
and the number of simulations, J , tend to infinity, and
√
M/J → 0 (see Gouriéroux and
Monfort (1997), for example).
The estimation involves three steps.
1. Estimation of the income processes. On-line appendix C gives the details.
2. Inner optimization. This step involves solving the model of risk sharing with LC to find the
state-dependent optimal intervals, given σi, σ, δ, ϕ, FYi , and FYv , ∀i. On-line appendix A
presents the details. Then, given the state-dependent optimal intervals, observed consump-
tions at time t− 1 and incomes at time t, and draws for measurement errors, the predicted
consumption allocation can be computed as described at the end of Section 2.2.16
3. Outer optimization. The log-likelihood (18) is maximized over the structural parameters,
θ =
(
σ, β, δ, ϕ, γ2c , γ
2
y
)
. For comparison, the model is also estimated without preference
heterogeneity, i.e., imposing β = 0 and γ2σ = 0.
Iterating between the dynamic program which solves the model and the likelihood maximiza-
tion routine is computationally very costly. Instead, I solve the model on a 4-dimensional grid
for σi, σ, δ, ϕ, given FYi and FYv . The optimal intervals given any parameter values are then
computed by linear interpolation. As a result, the model does not have to be solved again
and again while maximizing (18) with respect to θ. To find the parameter estimates, I iterate
between a standard optimization algorithm available in R17 and grid search in order to find
the global optimum.
The estimation of the model of risk sharing with LC involves both simulation and ap-
proximation. As Ackerberg et al. (2009) point out, in terms of the asymptotic properties
of the maximum likelihood estimator, approximation error in computed dynamic models has
similar effects as a limited number of simulations, and the results from the literature on sim-
ulated maximum likelihood estimation apply (Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994; Gouriéroux and
Monfort, 1997).
When computing the variance-covariance matrix, the information matrix equality is not
assumed to hold, and possible serial correlation is taken into account, as in the perfect risk
sharing case.
16The number of simulations, J , is 50, hence J >
√
M , because I have maximum 185 it (t = 2, ..., T )
observations per village.
17Namely, L-BFGS-B, a quasi-Newton method which allows box constraints on parameters.
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3.3 Model selection
To statistically compare the models, I use a model selection test introduced by Vuong (1989).
Vuong (1989) proposes a general test to compare two (nested or non-nested) models to de-
termine which model is closer to the true data-generating process, allowing for the possibility
that neither model is correctly specified.
The test is based on the difference between the log likelihood values of the two models.
Suppose that we want to compare model 1 and model 2 using M observations. Denote the
log likelihood of observation m for model 1 (2) at the estimated parameter vector by `1m (`2m).
The likelihood ratio is defined as
LR =
M∑
m=1
(
`1m − `2m
)
.
Denote the number of parameters to be estimated by q1 (q2) for model 1 (2).
Under the null that the two models are equally close to the data,
2LR ⇒ wχ2q1+q2 (·; κˆ) ,
where ⇒ means convergence in distribution and wχ2q1+q2 (·; κˆ) is the cumulative distribution
function of the weighted χ2 distribution, i.e., a weighted sum the squares of (q1+ q2) standard
normal variables. The weights κˆ are computed by finding the real, nonzero eigenvalues of the
matrix  −Bˆ1 (Aˆ1)−1 − Bˆ1,2 (Aˆ2)−1
Bˆ2,1
(
Aˆ1
)−1
Bˆ2
(
Aˆ2
)−1
 ,
where Aˆ1 =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2−∇2θ`1it, Bˆ1 =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 sˆ
1
itsˆ
1
it
′, where sˆ1it is the estimated score
for household i at time t for model 1, and similarly for model 2, and Bˆ1,2 = Bˆ2,1′ =∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 sˆ
1
itsˆ
2
it
′. The p-values of the weighted χ2 distribution have to be simulated. I do
100,000 replications.18
I compare four models: risk sharing with LC with heterogeneous preferences (LCui) and
with homogeneous preferences (LCu), and perfect risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences
(PRSui) and with homogeneous preferences (PRSu). The heterogenous versions of both models
nest their homogenous versions, and LC models nest their perfect risk sharing counterparts
with ϕ→ 1.19
18Vuong proposes a more powerful test for non-nested models. In particular, LR/√Mωˆ ⇒ N (0, 1),
where ωˆ is the estimated standard deviation of the likelihood ratio, that is, ωˆ2 = 1/M
∑M
m=1
(
`1m − `2m
)2 −(
1/M
∑M
m=1
(
`1m − `2m
))2
. Given that most pairwise model comparisons in this paper involve nested models, I
focus on the general test.
19Without the possibility for large punishments for deviating, the LC models do not nest their perfect risk
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4 Application
This section applies the estimation and model selection methods discussed above to study risk
sharing in three Indian villages.
4.1 Data
I use data from the Village Level Studies conducted by the International Crop Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India from 1975 to 1984.20 It is safe to
say that it is the most widely-used income-consumption survey from developing countries.
In particular, the ICRISAT dataset has been used by many papers studying risk sharing in
village economies, including Townsend (1994), Ligon (1998), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), Ligon
et al. (2002), and Mazzocco and Saini (2012). I focus on three villages, Aurepalle, Kanzara,
and Shirapur, and the years 1976 to 1981, because of concern over the accuracy of measured
consumption in the other years (Townsend, 1994; LTW).21
The non-durable consumption measure I use includes food consumption, clothing, services,
utilities, and narcotics. Income includes net income from crop production, labor, livestock,
and transfers from outside the village. Both consumption and income used in the analysis are
yearly and per adult equivalent. To compute the adult-equivalent size of each household, I use
the same age-gender weights as Townsend (1994).22 Preference heterogeneity is captured by
four variables: education, gender, age, and land as a proxy for initial wealth. That is, I include
these variables as zi. Education is the longitudinal average of the highest education level in
the household. Gender is measured by the average proportion of women among adults.23 Age
is the age of the head of the household at the initial period.24 To capture the effect of initial
wealth, I include the size of land operated at the initial period.25 I do not aim to find the best
sharing counterparts, because even as the discount factor approaches 1, perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing
only if the relative Pareto weight is in a certain interval. In other words, the LC model (with ex-post PCs)
nests a model of risk sharing with ex-ante PCs, but not the perfect risk sharing model with any Pareto weights.
20I thank ICRISAT for making the data available, Reena Badiani and Ethan Ligon for making their con-
structed aggregates available, and Maurizio Mazzocco and Shiv Saini for sharing data construction codes.
21A new dataset with a bigger sample spanning more than 10 years (6 of which are publicly available)
with frequent interviews has been collected, namely the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey. However, household
demographics, such as age and gender of household members, are not publicly available for each period. See
Attanasio (1999), for example, on the importance of accounting for household demographics when studying
consumption.
22These weights are: 1 for adult males, 0.9 for adult females, 0.94 and 0.83 for males and females aged 13-18,
respectively, 0.67 for children aged 7-12, 0.52 for children aged 4-6, 0.32 for children aged 1-3, and 0.05 for
infants below 1 year of age.
23I include this last variable instead of a female head dummy, because there are very few households headed
by a woman in rural India.
24Chiappori et al. (2013) find, using the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey, that age is most correlated with
households’ risk aversion assuming that risk sharing is perfect.
25LTW speculate that allowing for increasing relative risk aversion may help the model capture both the
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur
Variable Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Aeq. non-dur. cons.a 303.47 127.86 400.84 161.42 430.37 170.71
Aeq. incomea 629.58 429.78 984.42 742.54 792.16 577.57
Educationb 2.27 1.66 3.41 1.61 3.67 1.31
Proportion of women 0.49 0.26 0.54 0.23 0.50 0.25
Age 53.43 11.45 43.51 9.97 49.60 9.58
Aeq. landc 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.93 1.14 1.22
# of observations 204 222 186
# of households 34 37 31
aMeasured in 1975 Indian rupees per year. In 1975, approximately 8 Indian rupees
were worth 1 US dollar, which is about 4 dollars in 2013. bMeasured on a scale 1 =
illiterate to 8 = more than a first degree. cMeasured in hectares.
way to capture differences in the curvature of the current utility function across households,
due to its computational burden, only to see whether allowing for preference heterogeneity
improves the models’ fit to the data in a statistical and an economic sense, and whether
predicted policy effects differ.
Table 1 presents descriptive statics for the three villages. On average, daily non-durable
consumption per adult equivalent is 0.83, 1.10, and 1.18 1975 Indian rupees in Aurepalle,
Kandara, and Shirapur, respectively, which is about 0.42, 0.55, and 0.59 2013 US dollars,
respectively. The difference between non-durable consumption reflects durable consumption
and investment.
4.2 Reduced-form results
Before turning to the structural results, I present reduced-form evidence on how non-durable
consumption reacts to idiosyncratic income shocks. I regress the first difference of the log-
arithm of adult-equivalent consumption on the first difference of the logarithm of adult-
equivalent income, controlling for year dummies. I find that a one percent increase in household
income per adult equivalent leads to an increase of 0.206, 0.222, and 0.169 percent (with ro-
bust and clustered standard errors of 0.056, 0.065, and 0.057, which imply p-values of 0.000,
0.001, and 0.000) in household non-durable consumption per adult equivalent in Aurepalle,
Kandara, and Shirapur, respectively, controlling for aggregate consumption.26 These param-
eter estimates suggest that risk sharing is partial rather than perfect. However, households
in these three villages achieve a remarkable amount of insurance: only about one fifth of id-
dynamic response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks and cross-sectional consumption inequality.
26Note that these estimated coefficients are higher than the ones found by Townsend (1994). This is due to
differences in the measurement of income and consumption, see also Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997).
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iosyncratic income fluctuations translate into consumption fluctuations. Note that I have not
included any time-varying observables in these regressions. They serve to describe the dy-
namic response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks. Below I examine if LC models
are able to capture this response of consumption.
4.3 Structural estimation and model selection results
As a first step, households’ income processes have to be estimated, see Section 3.2.2.27 In the
baseline specification, I estimate the risk sharing models with measurement error in income
and last period’s consumption using an SMLE, but without an unobservable term in the
curvature of the utility function.28
Table 2 shows the baseline structural estimation and the model selection results for all three
villages. The bottom panel shows the model selection tests, conducting Vuong’s general test
(see Section 3.3) to statistically compare the models for the three villages. Three conclusions
can be drawn from the results. (i) Models with LC explain the consumption data significantly
better compared to their perfect risk sharing counterparts. That is, we can reject perfect risk
sharing against a fully-specified model of partial mutual insurance. (ii) Models with preference
heterogeneity are able to fit the consumption data significantly better than their homogenous
counterparts. (iii) The PRSui model outperforms the LCu model in a statistical sense.
The top panel of Table 2 shows the structural parameter estimates. Allowing for preference
heterogeneity leads to remarkably stable estimates for both δ and σ across the three villages:
the former varies between 0.917 and 0.939, and the latter between 0.941 and 1.180. Hence,
these data suggest that the coefficient of RRA is close to 1, and that households in these
villages discount the future at about 8 percent, a rate twice as high as what is usually assumed.
The estimated δ and σ vary greatly across the three villages when preferences are assumed
homogenous, between 1.448 and 3.387 and 0.791 and 0.980, respectively. The estimates for
ϕ, the fraction of consumption lost in autarky, vary substantially across villages for both LC
models, hence we learn little about this parameter other than that it is not zero.
Turning to the heterogeneity parameters, according to the estimates in Table 2, households’
coefficient of RRA depends positively on education and negatively on land operated in all
three villages (except for the perfect risk model in Aurepalle and Shirapur where land is not
significant), and positively on the proportion of women and negatively on age in Aurepalle and
27On-line appendix C shows the estimated parameters of the income processes. It also explains how the
processes are discretized.
28As robustness checks I also estimate the models (i) without measurement error in income and last period’s
consumption, and (ii) with measurement errors, as in the baseline, and adding an unobservable term in the
curvature of the utility function with γσ = 0.02. These robustness checks are presented in on-line appendix D.
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Table 3: Do the models capture the dynamic response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks?
Dependent variable: ∆ log true cons. – ∆ log predicted cons. Explanatory variable: ∆ log income 11
2
LCui LCu PRSui PRSu LCui LCu PRSui PRSu LCui LCu PRSui PRSu
Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur
(0.091∗ (0.192∗∗∗ (0.227∗∗∗ (0.206∗∗∗ (0.106 (0.202∗∗∗ (0.284∗∗∗ (0.222∗∗∗ (0.077 (0.080∗ (0.144∗∗∗ (0.169∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.064) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064) (0.063) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047)
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions.
∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at 5%, and ∗ at 10%.
Shirapur (except for the perfect risk model in Aurepalle where neither is significant), while
the opposite is true in Kanzara.29,30
Next, I evaluate the models in terms of how well they can capture consumption dynamics
and the cross-sectional variation of consumption. First, I check whether changes in income
explain the difference between changes in true consumption and changes in predicted con-
sumptions. If income is not significant in such a regression, then the corresponding model has
been able to account for the dynamic response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks.
Table 3 shows the results. For the LCui model changes in income are not significant at the
five percent level. The point estimates for the coefficients on income changes are about half
of those in Section 4.2. The perfect risk sharing models, not surprisingly, fail this test, and
the LCu model cannot account for the dynamic response of consumption to income in two of
the three villages.
Second, I compute what fraction of the variation of consumption unexplained by house-
hold and time effects each model captures. In order to do this, I regress the residuals from
regressions of predicted consumption from each model on household and time dummies on the
residuals from regressing true consumption on household and time dummies. The R2s of these
regressions tell us how well each model does according to this criterion. Table 4 presents the
numbers. For the first two villages, the LCui model is able to capture about 21.7 percent of
the variation of consumption unexplained by household and time effects. The other models
also do well for Aurepalle. All models do badly according to this measure for Shirapur.
Third, I compute two measures of cross-sectional consumption inequality for the data
and consumption predicted by each model, namely, the variance of log consumption and the
Gini coefficient (see e.g. Krueger et al., 2010). I then compute (i) average inequality, (ii) the
correlation between true inequality and inequality predicted by each model, (iii) the correlation
29Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine which features of the data cause these two parameters to switch
sign for Kanzara. The heterogeneity parameters capture that (i) more risk-averse households should bear less
uninsurable risk, and (ii) because of LC less risk-averse households should have higher average consumption
for given consumption risk and bear less consumption risk given average consumption, because the value of
(risky) autarky consumption is higher for them.
30On-line appendix E presents descriptive statistics for the coefficients of RRA from the two models with
heterogenous preferences to get a sense of how much preference heterogeneity the estimated parameters imply.
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Table 4: What fraction of the variation of consumption can the models explain above what is
possible with household and time dummies?
LCui LCu PRSui PRSu LCui LCu PRSui PRSu LCui LCu PRSui PRSu
Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur
0.213 0.218 0.157 0.202 0.220 0.080 0.094 0.076 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.000
Notes: R2 from regressing the residuals from a regression of predicted consumption on household and
time dummies on the residuals from a regression of true consumption on household and time dummies.
Table 5: How well can the models account for consumption inequality and changes in inequality?
Variance of log consumption Gini coefficient
Data LCui LCu PRSui PRSu Data LCui LCu PRSui PRSu
Average inequality 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20
Corr(true inequality,
0.82 0.44 0.60 0.63 0.79 0.13 0.19 0.30predicted inequality)
Corr(∆ true inequality,
0.60 -0.07 0.15 0.31 0.07 -0.17 -0.04 -0.21
∆ predicted inequality)
between changes in true inequality and changes in inequality predicted by each model (i.e.,
predicted inequality minus true inequality in the previous period). Since this results in only
5 observations for each village, Table 5 presents the results combining the three villages.
When the variance of log consumption is used as a measure of inequality, the LCu model
underpredicts consumption inequality on average (as in Krueger and Perri, 2006), while the
heterogenous version overpredicts it. The perfect risk sharing models do better in capturing
inequality on average. This is not surprising, however, since with many observations they
would exactly match average inequality. When the Gini coefficient is used as a measure of
inequality, the prediction for average inequality from the LCui model almost exactly matches
that of the data. The correlation between predicted and true inequality and the correlation
between predicted and true changes in inequality are in favor of the LCui model. The former
correlation is 82.4% and 79.0% for the variance of log consumption and the Gini coefficient,
respectively, while the latter is as high as 59.8% when the variance of log consumption measures
inequality. The LCu model completely fails at predicting changes in inequality.
4.4 Policy simulation
This subsection uses the estimated structural models to examine the effects of a counterfactual
tax and transfer policy. I consider income taxation at a 30 percent rate, the revenues of which
are given out as lump-sum transfers, i.e., the policy is progressive and revenue-neutral for
each village. Note that the policy can be thought of as public insurance (Krueger and Perri,
2011; Broer, 2011). I study the effects of this policy on the consumption of both poor and
rich households. The poor are defined as households with average income below the village
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Table 6: The effects of a counterfactual tax and transfer policy
Average change in... predicted cons. predicted CE cons. consumption income
LCui LCu LCui LCu (direct redist.)
Aurepalle Poor 2.19 -3.46 2.96 -1.81 10.66 32.01Rich -2.19 3.46 -4.15 9.89 -10.66 -32.01
Kanzara Poor 6.08 1.95 6.72 2.45 15.69 45.08Rich -6.42 -2.05 -5.94 -1.90 -16.56 -47.58
Shirapur Poor 8.21 8.16 7.86 8.65 21.26 34.10Rich -8.76 -8.71 -7.87 -7.58 -22.64 -36.37
Notes: Poor households are those with average income below the village median. CE consump-
tion = certainty-equivalent consumption.
median.31 I simulate the effects of the policy considering each possible time of introduction,
t = 2, ..., 6, assuming in each case that the policy will remain in place in all future periods,
and average over the predicted consumption changes at the time of introduction.
According to perfect risk sharing models, redistributive policies have no effect on the
consumption allocation. This is because aggregate consumption does not change, and con-
sumption shares are given by predetermined Pareto weights. On the contrary, LC models
are able to predict a redistribution of consumption as a result of income redistribution. Ta-
ble 6 summarizes the simulation results for the LC models, both in terms of changes in pre-
dicted consumption (columns 1 and 2) and changes in certainty-equivalent (CE) consumption
(columns 3 and 4), a measure of welfare. For comparison, Table 6 also presents the effects
of the policy on consumption under the assumption that the tax and transfer policy can be
applied to consumption directly (column 5) and on income (column 6).
The LC models predict that the increase in consumption by the poor is about 20 to 40
percent of the increase of direct consumption redistribution. LC models are able to predict an
increase in consumption by the poor, because the value of their outside option increases more
than that of the rich as a result of the tax and transfer policy. Further, allowing for preference
heterogeneity matters quantitatively: ignoring it would result in predicting lower benefits for
the poor by about 4.5 rupees in certainty-equivalent consumption per adult equivalent when
conducting ex-ante policy evaluation for two of the three villages. This is because the poor
are more risk averse given the estimated heterogeneity parameters (see on-line appendix E),
which means that the reduction in income risk implied by the policy increases their autarky
utility more.32
31Median income is 237.4, 322.4, and 356.4 rupees per year per adult equivalent in Aurepalle, Kanzara,
and Shirapur, respectively. Poor households’ average income is 138.4, 242.9, and 321.0, respectively. Average
income of the rich is 351.8, 551.7, and 556.0, respectively.
32However, this only matters if participation constraints of poor households bind sufficiently often relative
to those of the rich. For Shirapur the predicted consumption changes are almost identical with and without
preference heterogeneity. This is because in this village the participation constraints of some rich households
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper has compared four models of risk sharing in terms of how well they can explain
the consumption allocation in three Indian villages. The results suggest that both limitations
to the enforcement of informal risk sharing contracts and heterogeneity in risk preferences are
important in explaining consumption shares in a statistical sense in all villages studied. The
limited commitment model with heterogenous preferences also outperforms the benchmark
models in terms of (i) explaining the response of consumption to idiosyncratic income shocks,
(ii) accounting for the variation of consumption unexplained by household fixed effects and
time dummies, and (iii) capturing the variation of inequality across time and villages and
predicting changes in inequality, as measured by the variance of log consumption and the Gini
coefficient.
Using the structural estimation results, this paper has then simulated the effects on the
consumption allocation of a counterfactual tax and transfer policy. Perfect risk sharing models
predict no change in the consumption allocation as a result of such a policy, while models with
limited commitment are able to predict an increase in consumption by the poor. Allowing for
preference heterogeneity is quantitatively important when predicting the effects of the policy.
Research on the structural modeling of how consumption is allocated among households in
poor communities can serve as an input for policy evaluation and design. Policy-makers and
members of non-governmental organizations could have a better understanding of the effects
of their programs, such as redistributive policies or micro-insurance programs, by taking into
account existing informal arrangements to share risk.
Several interesting extensions are possible. First, whether heterogeneity in the discount
factor across households is important should also be addressed. Second, other models of
mutual risk sharing could be incorporated into the analysis, such as a model of risk sharing
with private information (Wang, 1995).33 Another important task for future work is to bring
models with limited commitment and individual saving (Ligon et al., 2000; Ábrahám and
Laczó, 2014) to the data. Finally, when complete markets do not exist to insure against
income fluctuations, households are expected to smooth their income, not just consumption
(Morduch, 1995). This could be formalized in the context of this paper, endogenizing income
by allowing households to choose between several income generating processes. Then, the cost
of imperfect consumption insurance in terms of lower expected incomes could be quantified.
with low risk aversion bind relatively more often.
33In a recent paper, Kinnan (2014) finds that asymmetric information about income realizations is impor-
tant in accounting for partial insurance in Thai villages. Whether such a model is useful for predicting the
consumption allocation and quantitative policy effects is to be studied.
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